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Identity, Culture and Stories: Empathy and the War 
on Terrorism
William D. Casebeer*
According to the current National Security Strategy, the 
global war on terror is a specific focus for national security.1 
While billions have been spent prosecuting some aspects of 
this  war  (for  example,  by  attacking  state  sponsors  of 
terrorism), other aspects have been neglected. Here, I argue 
that grand counter-terrorism strategy would benefit from a 
comprehensive  consideration  of  the  stories  terrorists  tell. 
Understanding  the  narratives  that  influence  the  genesis, 
growth,  maturation,  and  transformation  of  terrorist 
organizations will enable us to better fashion a strategy for 
undermining  the  efficacy  of  those  narratives  to  deter, 
disrupt,  and  defeat  terrorist  groups.  Such  a  “counter-
narrative  strategy”  will  have  multiple  components  with 
layered asynchronous effects. While effective counter-stories 
will be difficult to coordinate and will involve multiple agents 
of  action,  their  formulation  is  a  necessary  part  of  any 
comprehensive counter-terrorism effort. Indeed, a failure on 
our part to come to grips with the narrative dimensions of 
the war on terrorism, and with the larger concept of culture 
of  which  it  is  a  part,  is  a  weakness  already  exploited  by 
groups such as Al Qaeda. We can fully expect any adaptive 
adversary  to  act  quickly  to  fill  story  gaps  and  exploit 
weaknesses in  our  narrative  to  ensure continued survival. 
More  than  giving  us  another  tool  with  which  to  confront 
terrorism,  narrative  considerations  also  allow  us  to  deal 
better in general with the emerging security threat of violent 
non-state actors and armed groups. A critical portion of the 
system  responsible  for  the  production  and  replication  of 
socially transmitted behaviors will be that which deals with 
narratives and stories.
Justifying the need for and exploring the components of 
a counter-narrative strategy is a task for a book; this Article 
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briefly sketches only the basics, discussing the psychological 
aspects  of  counter-terrorism  and  why  stories  will  play  a 
critical  role  in  the  ecosystem  of  violence,  the  essential 
components of a story, a typology of narratives offered by 
nascent  terrorist  groups  throughout  their  development,  a 
simple  Aristotelian  rhetorical  model  for  evaluating  story 
success,  principles  to  guide  the  formulation  of  counter-
narratives,  and  complications  and  provisos,  as  well  as  a 
consideration of the institutional implications of my position. 
This  summary  intends  to  provoke  thought  about  new 
counter-terrorism tools.
Why  think  that  storytelling  has  anything  to  do  with 
terrorism and counter-terrorism? Consider  the ineliminable 
psychological aspects of terrorism: People choose to form or 
join organizations that use indiscriminant violence as a tactic 
to achieve their political objectives for multiple reasons—all 
of  them  dealing  at  some  point  with  human  psychology. 
People  feel  alienated  from  their  surroundings;  they  are 
denied political  opportunity by the state; the state fails  to 
provide  basic  necessities;  they  identify  with  those  who 
advocate the use of violence; they are angered by excessive 
state force against political opponents; their essential needs 
are not being met; they feel deprived relative to peer groups 
elsewhere.  These  have  been  offered  as  “root  causes”  of 
contentious politics in general and terrorism in particular. My 
purpose is not to defend any particular position about root 
causes, but merely to point out that these causes have a 
proximate psychological mechanism. They exert influence by 
affecting the human mind and brain. If stories are part and 
parcel  of  human  cognition,  we  would  also  consequently 
expect that stories might affect how these causes play out to 
germinate, grow, and sustain terrorism.
1. WHAT IS IN A STORY?
The lack  of  any widely  accepted  definition  for  “story” 
hampers  discussion  of  stories  and  narratives.  Indeed,  an 
entire  school  of  thought  in  literary  criticism  (“post 
modernism”) is predicated on the fact that no necessary and 
sufficient list exists of conditions a piece of text must meet 
to be a story.  We can agree with the postmodernists that 
defining “story”  is  difficult  without thinking,  however,  that 
the  concept  plays  no  useful  purpose.  In  that  sense,  the 
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concept  “story”  is  like  the  concept  “game.”  No  list  of 
necessary and sufficient conditions exists for  a game, but 
that does not mean the concept is useless or that no “family 
resemblances”  exist  between  games  that  are  useful  to 
consider.
A good beginning at a theory of stories comes from the 
nineteenth-century German writer Gustav Freytag.  Freytag 
believed  that  narratives  followed  a  general  pattern:  a 
beginning, a problem that leads to a climax, and a resolution 
of the problem as an ending. A coherent unified story could 
thus  be  as  short  as  three  sentences  consisting  of  setup, 
climax,  and resolution:  “John was hungry.  He went to the 
store  and  bought  a  sandwich.  It  was  delicious.”  This 
particular story is not very interesting or compelling, but it 
nonetheless is a coherent narrative. This “Freytag Triangle,” 
depicted below, captures the general structure of a story:2
Figure 1. The Freytag Triangle (1863)3
Contemporary  literary  theorist  Patrick  Hogan  amplifies 
the  basic  Freytag  structure,  pointing  out  that  most  plots 
involve an agent (normally, a hero or protagonist) striving to 
2
2
. See  generally ELIAS J.  MACEWAN,  FREYTAG’S TECHNICUE OF THE DRAMA:  AN 
EXPOSITION OF DRAMATIC COMPOSITION AND ART BY GUSTAV FREYTAG (Benjamin Blom, Inc. 
1968) (1863).
3
3
. Barbara  McManus,  Freytag’s  Triangle,  http://www.cnr.edu/home/ 
bmcmanus/freytag.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2008). I am indebted to Dr. 
McManus for allowing me to make use her Freytag Triangle graphic.
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achieve some goal, usually despite the machinations of an 
antagonist,  or  villain.  The  structure  includes  a  person,  or 
group  of  persons,  and  a  series  of  events  driven  by  their 
attempts  to  achieve  some  objective.4 The  study  of 
mythology and consideration of most forms of storytelling, 
whether oral, written, traditional, or contemporary, support 
this familiar analysis.5
2. STORIES AND HUMAN PSYCHOLOGY
Using this working “theory of story,” we can gain insight 
into  why  stories  are  so  important  for  structuring  human 
thought.  First,  stories  often  are  rich  in  metaphors  and 
analogies; metaphors, in turn, affect our most basic attitudes 
toward the world. For example, suppose we think of “Islamic 
fundamentalism”  as  a  disease.  A  simple  narrative  about 
fundamentalist  Islam  might  be  this:  “We  want  world 
communities  to  respect  human  rights.  Fundamentalist 
Muslims  disrespect  some of  those  rights.  We can  prevent 
them from doing  more  harm by  taking  action  now.”  This 
implies a series of actions that ought to be done in reaction 
to  fundamentalism (e.g.,  combat  its  spread,  focus  on this 
“public  health  problem”  by  inoculating  people  against  it, 
consider those who try to spread it as “evil agents up to no 
good” or at the very least as modern day “Typhoid Marys”).6
Reasoning  by  metaphor  and  analogy,  a  research 
program  explored  by  Mark  Johnson,  George  Lakoff,  Giles 
Fauconnier, and Mark Turner argues that our most complex 
mental  tasks  are usually  carried out  not  by the “classical 
mechanics”  of  rational  actor  theory  (where  stories  really 
have no place, or are, at least relegated to the background), 
4
4
. See PATRICK COLM HOGAN,  THE MIND AND ITS STORIES: NARRATIVE UNIVERSALS AND 
HUMAN EMOTION 205–12, 221–27 (2003).
5
5
. See RAPHAEL PATAI, THE ARAB MIND 43–77 (Charles Scribner’s Sons 1983) 
(1976) for an interesting and extremely controversial take on the role of 
narrative  in  the  “Arab  mind.”  Recall  Joseph  Campbell’s  analysis  of  the 
structure of most famous legends from antiquity, which involve striving on 
the  part  of  a  hero,  a  test  of  some kind,  and  a  return  to  the  point  of 
departure  with  new  knowledge  and  greater  self-understanding.  JOSEPH 
CAMPBELL, THE HERO WITH A THOUSAND FACES 30 (Pantheon Books 1961) (1949).
6
6
. Again,  I  do  not  think  the  contagion  metaphor  is  necessarily 
appropriate, even for morally objectionable forms of fundamentalist Islam. 
But  compare  some  of  the  rhetoric  from  Daniel  Pipes, 
http://www.danielpipes.  org  (last  visited  Mar.  17,  2008).  For  interesting 
responses to this rhetoric,  see any of the articles from  THE NEW CRUSADES: 
CONSTRUCTING THE MUSLIM ENEMY (Emran Qureshi & Michal A. Sells eds., 2003).
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but  rather  by  a  set  of  analogy  making  and  metaphor 
mapping abilities  that  form the core of  human cognition.7 
Exploration  into  the  “story-telling  mind”  is  a  research 
program  that  combines  metaphor  and  analogy  into  an 
examination  of  the  powerful  grip  narrative  has  on human 
cognition. Narratives can restructure our mental  spaces in 
ways  that  profoundly  affect  our  reasoning  ability  and, 
ultimately, what we make of the world. Think of the grip that 
the “Jihad versus McWorld”8 narrative has on Al Qaeda and 
how this  affects  the way they think about the future.9 As 
Mark Turner notes, “Story is a basic principle of mind. Most 
of  our  experience,  our  knowledge,  and  our  thinking  is 
organized as stories.”10
If  making  stories  foundational  to  thought  seems  a 
stretch, ample evidence supports the proposition that stories 
influence our ability to recall events, motivate people to act, 
modulate  our  emotional  reactions  to  events,  cue  certain 
heuristics  and  biases,  structure  our  problem-solving 
capabilities, and ultimately perhaps even constitute our very 
identity.11 Stories  probably  play  a  role  in  developing  and 
7
7
. Classic works include GILLES FAUCONNIER & MARK TURNER, THE WAY WE THINK: 
CONCEPTUAL BLENDING AND THE MIND’S HIDDEN COMPLEXITIES (2002); DEDRE GENTNER, KEITH 
HOLYOAK, &  BOICHO KOKINOV,  THE ANALOGICAL MIND: PERSPECTIVES FROM COGNITIVE SCIENCE 
(2001); GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).
8
8
. This is the structuring metaphor of Benjamin Barber’s “clash of the 
world  views”  book,  BENJAMIN R.  BARBER,  JIHAD VS.  MCWORLD:  HOW GLOBALISM AND 
TRIBALISM ARE RESHAPING THE WORLD (1995). See generally SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE 
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (Touchstone 1998) (1997).
9
9
. See FAUCONNIER & TURNER,  supra note  7, at  249–53;  MARK TURNER, THE 
LITERARY MIND 20 (1996).
10
1
. TURNER,  supra 9, at v.  See generally Anthony Patton, The World as 
Story (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
11 . See, e.g., Mabel Chau-ping Wong, The Effects of Story Schemata on 
Narrative  Recall,  in THINKING LANGUAGE,  147,  147–70  (Kitty  P.  Y.  Wong  & 
Christopher  F.  Green  eds.,  1995),  available  at 
http://repository.ust.hk/dspace/  bitstream/1783.1/1337/1/thinklang10.pdf; 
Daniel  Dennett,  The  Self  as  Center  of  Narrative  Gravity,  in  SELF AND 
CONSCIOUSNESS: MULTIPLE PERSPECTIVES 103–15 (Frank S. Kessel et al., eds., 1992), 
available  at http://ase.tufts.edu/  cogstud/papers/selfctr.htm;  Arthur  C. 
Graesser  &  Glenn  V.  Nakamura,  The  Impact  of  a  Schema  on 
Comprehension and Memory, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF LEARNING AND MOTIVATION 59 (H. 
Bower  ed.  1982);  ALICIA JUARRERO,  DYNAMICS IN ACTION 217–44  (1999);  TROY S. 
THOMAS & WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, USAF INSTITUTE FOR NAT’L SECURITY STUDIES, OCCASIONAL 
PAPER NO. 52, VIOLENT SYSTEMS: DEFEATING TERRORISTS, INSURGENTS, AND OTHER NON-STATE 
ADVERSARIES 69,  75  (2004),  available  at http://www. 
usafa.af.mil/df/inss/occasion.cfm [hereinafter VIOLENT SYSTEMS]; TROY S. THOMAS, 
STEPHEN D. KISER & WILLIAM D. CASEBEER,  WARLORDS RISING: CONFRONTING VIOLENT NON-
STATE ACTORS 190–91 (2005).
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cuing empathy for other members of your salient group. Any 
of these aspects of the narrative would be fascinating and 
important to examine in detail.
Now  that  we  have  a  basic  understanding  of  what 
narratives  are,  and  have  reason  to  believe  they  are 
influential  in  acts  of  human  cognition  salient  to  terrorist 
group formation, we can examine the role stories play across 
the life cycle of terrorist organizations.
3. NARRATIVES AND TERRORIST ORGANIZATION LIFE 
CYCLES
Terrorist  organizations  have  life  cycles.  They  have  a 
genesis  point,  they  grow,  reach  maturity,  and  eventually 
transform by, among other things, dying, being co-opted by 
the state,  or morphing into a peaceful  non-state actor.  As 
Thomas  and  Casebeer  have  pointed  out,  different 
organizational structures develop during this life cycle, some 
more important than others depending on the organization’s 
degree  of  development.12 During  maturity,  terrorist 
organizations  will  develop  survival  as  a  goal,  and  this 
organizational  consideration  can  help  us  understand  why 
they  take  some  of  the  actions  they  do.13 The  life  cycle 
concept follows naturally from thinking of the conditions that 
give rise to terrorism as an environment conducive to the 
formation  of  violent  non-state  actors  (VNSA).  These 
environments  are  typified  by  failures  in  governance,  pre-
existing  identity  cleavages,  resource  scarcity  and 
deprivation,  and  lack  of  political  opportunity.  When  these 
“push” factors (i.e., active causes that spur the formation of 
a violent non-state actor) produce a potential VNSA (usually 
at the behest of a foundational “identity entrepreneur”), the 
stage  is  set  for  the  growth  and  maturation  of  a  nascent 
organization. At maturity, a VNSA will have developed a suite 
of  functions  it  must  implement  if  it  is  to  maintain  its 
12
1
. See Troy S. Thomas & William D. Casebeer, Deterring Violent Non-
State Actors in the New Millenium [sic], STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Dec. 2002, at 1–2, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/dec02/terrorism2.pdf;  Troy  S.  Thomas  & 
William  D.  Casebeer,  Violent  Non-State  Actors:  Countering  Dynamic 
Systems, STRATEGIC INSIGHTS, Mar. 2004, at 2–4, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/
2004/ mar/casebeerMar04.pdf;  see also VIOLENT SYSTEMS,  supra note  11, at 
47–51.
13 . Martha  Crenshaw,  Theories  of  Terrorism:  Instrumental  and 
Organizational Approaches,  in INSIDE TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS 13, 19–26 (David 
C. Rapoport ed., 1988).
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existence  as  an  organization.  These  processes  include 
support (e.g., get resources, cultivate stakeholder relations), 
maintenance (e.g., sanction defectors from the organization, 
reward loyal service), cognition (e.g., plan, learn and control) 
and conversion (e.g.,  produce terrorist  acts,  provide social 
services to the community).  A mature organization that is 
functioning well has a smooth fit between these processes 
(called  “congruence”)  and  also  has  reserves  in  case  the 
inputs  from  the  environment  turn  sour  or  can  no  longer 
support the organization (these reserves constitute what is 
called “negative entropy,” a term of art that refers to stores 
of organized inputs such as money or ready recruits that can 
help  insulate  systems  against  environmental  change  or 
disruption  of  critical  needs).  The  following  schematic 
summarizes this understanding:
Figure 2. Sub-System Functions in a Terrorist Organization.14
Note  the  multiple  critical  roles  narratives  play 
throughout the life cycle. During genesis, stories (1) provide 
incentives for recruitment,  particularly  by providing justice 
frames  (simple  narratives  which  frame  discontent  using 
terms of justice, such as insisting that territory was wrongly 
taken by others from you or your in-group in the past) that 
serve to mobilize discontent, (2) help justify the need for an 
14
1
. Graphic adopted from Troy S. Thomas.
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organization to the community in which it will be embedded, 
and  to  first-round  stakeholders  (those  people  and 
organizations who, at least initially, provide critical support 
to  the  organization),  (3)  reinforce  pre-existing  identities 
friendly  to  the  nascent  organization,  (4)  create  necessary 
identities  where  none  exist,  (5)  set  the  stage  for  further 
growth  of  the  organization,  (6)  solidify  founding members 
into leadership roles,  and (7) define the possible space of 
actions as the organization matures.
During growth, narratives do all of the above and also (1) 
reinforce role-specific obligations to ensure group members 
continue  to  accomplish  their  functions,  (2)  provide 
“firewalls” against attempts to discredit foundational myths, 
(3) articulate ideological niches for the organization, and (4) 
make  salient  to  organization  members  the  environmental 
conditions conducive to organizational growth.
During maturity, stories (1)  link into the command and 
control  system  of  the  organization  for  tweaking  and 
updating,  (2)  serve  as  insulation  against  environmental 
change,  (3)  actively  support  operations  by  motivating 
organizational  members  and  channeling  organizational 
thought down pre-set  canals  useful  for  the group,  (4)  are 
used  as  “top  cover”  to  allow  the  organization  to  adapt, 
change goals, or otherwise modify structure and function to 
ensure continued survival.
During  transformation,  narratives  (1)  smooth  the 
transition  to  new  organizational  forms,  (2)  help  ease  the 
organization into a different set of stakeholder relationships, 
(3) provide the foundation for the revivified identities which 
will be used in whatever new form the organization adopts, 
and  (4)  serve  to  demobilize  those  portions  of  the 
organization  that  served  their  purpose  or  are  no  longer 
needed.15
4. A NARRATIVE TYPOLOGY
While  the  diversity  of  purposes  served  by  stories  in 
terrorist organizations makes a typology of stories difficult, 
stories can still be grouped into useful camps. For instance, 
foundational myths can be transactional or transcendental. 
15
1
. These purposes deserve elaboration. No doubt empirical examples 
come  to  mind  for  many  of  them.  A  thorough  defense  would  require 
inductive justification, but for now intuitive plausibility must do.
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Transactional, or pragmatic, foundational myths emphasize 
transactional or instrumental considerations: if you join our 
terrorist organization, our use of violence will enable you to 
achieve certain materially realizable individual and collective 
goals. For example, together we will make money, together 
we will  found a new state,  or together we will  change an 
unjust  practice.  Transcendental  foundational  myths 
emphasize otherworldly goals that are implausible to expect 
to  see  realized  or  that  reject  worldly  manifestation 
altogether.  For  example,  together we will  find paradise in 
God’s  bosom,  together  we  will  convert  every  soul  in  the 
world  to  Scientology.  Both  can  be  used  in  concert.  Al 
Qaeda’s  foundational  myth  involves  elements  of  both: 
transactional  pragmatic  goals  and transcendental  religious 
goals.
What is the basic structure of some of these stories and 
narratives?  In  his  paper  Terror’s  Mask:  Insurgency  Within 
Islam,  political  scientist  Michael  Vlahos  identifies  four 
elements  of  Al  Qaeda-style  narrative  tropes:  (1)  a  heroic 
journey  and  a  mythic  figure,  (2)  the  rhythm  of  history 
captured  as  epic  struggle  and  story,  (3)  the  commanded 
charge  of  renewal,  and  (4)  history  revealed  and  enjoined 
through mystic literary form.16
According to Vlahos, the foundational mythic figure for 
Islam is Muhammad. Bin Laden taps into this theme when he 
portrays himself as following in the footsteps of Muhammad. 
He too is making a heroic journey, struggling against great 
odds, in a way that makes him almost as mythic in stature, 
and hence all the posters and stickers praising him in places 
like Pakistan or Afghanistan. Part of  the reason why he is 
mythic is because of the second element: bin Laden argues 
that  he  is  part  of  a  grand  struggle  against  Western 
imperialism and decadence. His actions are part of a story 
that is linked to the very fabric of Muslim history (and given 
the fact that this history was in fact laced with Orientialism 
and  colonialism,  it  is  no  surprise  that  charges  of  neo-
Orientialism and  neo-colonialism stick so easily).  The third 
aspect of the story is important: only by struggling against 
these dark forces can one be renewed. To fail to struggle is 
16
1
. MICHAEL VLAHOS, JOINT WARFARE ANALYSIS DEP’T, TERROR’S MASK: INSURGENCY WITHIN 
ISLAM 8  (2002),  available  at http://www.jhuapl.edu/POW/ 
library/Terror_Islamsm.pdf. Again, note the similarity to parts of Campbell’s 
corpus. See generally CAMPBELL, supra note 5.
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to fail to play your part in a narrative that ends with Islam 
triumphing over the infidel West. Finally, owing to the fourth 
element,  the  story  contains  built  in  “insulation”  from 
temporary  tactical  successes  on  the  part  of  occupying 
forces: the mystical element of the narrative, especially its 
otherworldly component involving rewards in the afterlife’s 
paradise, means that temporal success will not necessarily 
defuse  the  logic  of  the  story.  Resistance  can  and  should 
continue even if the security situation improves in the short 
term,  although  brute  facts  about  human  psychology  may 
undermine the effectiveness of that story in the long run in 
the face of improvements in the procurement of basic needs.
Closely  related  to  Vlahos’s  ideas  about  the  essential 
elements  of  the  Islamic  fundamentalist  narrative  is 
sociologist Mark Juergensmeyer’s theory of “cosmic war.”17 
Juergensmeyer suggests that religious tropes are more likely 
to  play  a  narrative  role  if  the  confrontation  between  two 
groups can be characterized as a cosmic struggle or battle. 
This is most likely in the following circumstances:
(1) The struggle is perceived as a defense of basic 
identity and dignity.
(2)Losing the struggle would be unthinkable.
(3)If the struggle is blocked and cannot be won in real 
time or in real terms.18
To amplify, in cases where the struggle is over extremely 
basic questions of identity and where basic human rights are 
at stake; if losing the struggle seems Armageddon-like (e.g., 
you would tell a very bad story if your resistance failed); and 
if  the struggle  is  perceived as  being hopeless in concrete 
terms (e.g., it  is impossible to see how we could beat the 
occupiers using traditional  “force-on-force” confrontations), 
then it is  very likely that the struggle can more easily be 
framed  in  religious  and  metaphysical  terms  as  a  cosmic 
struggle,  in  which  case  recruitment  into  organizations 
becomes easier  for  certain  target  populations  (e.g.,  those 
predisposed to accept transcendental foundational myths).
Certainly,  multiple  narrative  structures  are  at  play  in 
17
1
. Critically, this is one of the characterizations of Islam that Qureshi 
and Sells object to in the first article in their edited collection. Qureshi & 
Sells, Introduction:  Constructing the  Muslim Enemy,  in THE NEW CRUSADES: 
CONSTRUCTING THE MUSLIM ENEMY, supra note 6, at 4.
18 . See MARK JUERGENSMEYER,  TERROR IN THE MIND OF GOD:  THE GLOBAL RISE OF 
RELIGIOUS VIOLENCE 164–65 (3d ed. 2003).
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terrorism,  but  hopefully  this  brief  survey  has  shown  that 
categorizing  them into  different  types  can  help  us  better 
understand how to render inert the role they play in terrorist 
organizational growth. How do we go about countering these 
stories?
5. COUNTER-NARRATIVE STRATEGIES
To address this practical question, we will  first discuss 
counter-narrative strategies in generic terms, and then offer 
guidance that is more specific. Important generic principles 
for  counter-narrative  strategy  include  competing  myth 
creation,  foundational  myth  deconstruction,  alternative 
exemplar  creation,  metaphor  shifts,  identity 
gerrymandering, and structural disruption.
Myth  creation  involves  the  weaving  together  of  the 
narrative  elements  of  a  story  with  facts  about  past  and 
present  situations  to  create  an  emotionally  compelling 
background  that  very  often  directly  influences  the 
susceptibility  of  a  population  to  manipulation  by  “myth 
mongers.”  The  fanatical  devotion  shown  by  al  Qaeda 
operatives stems in large part from the success Osama bin 
Laden and others  have had in  fashioning  a  coherent  and 
appealing  foundational  myth,  not  from  any  rational 
deliberative  process.  The  events  of  September  11 can  be 
thought of as the punch line of a chapter in an epic that sets 
“the warriors of God” against an “infidel West.” This myth 
did  not  propagate  itself  via  rational  actor  channels,  but 
instead was indoctrinated through a multi-pronged effort on 
the part of  fundamentalist  strains of  Islam (such as Saudi 
Arabia’s  Wahhabis).19 Successful  myth  creation  may  very 
well leverage heuristics and biases cognitive scientists tell us 
are  present  in  human  cognition;  they  certainly  take 
advantage  of  the  availability  heuristic,  as  this  heuristic 
probably  undergirds  human  propensity  to  form 
stereotypes.20
Myth  creation  usually  involves  the  effective  use  of 
19
1
. TROY S. THOMAS ET AL., WARLORDS RISING: CONFRONTING VIOLENT NON-STATE ACTORS 
139–40 (2005).
20
2
. Amos  Tversky  &  Daniel  Kahneman,  Availability:  A  Heuristic  for 
Judging  Frequency  and  Probability,  5  COGNITIVE PSYCHOL.  207,  207  (1973); 
Denise  R.  Beike  &  Steven  J.  Sherman,  Social  Inference:  Inductions, 
Seductions, and Analogies, in 1 HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL COGNITION 209, 214 (Robert 
S. Wyer, Jr. & Thomas K Srull eds., 1994).
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narrative. As we formulate an “affective strategy,” we should 
keep the elements of a narrative in mind, for it is only by 
disrupting  the  story  that  you  can  interfere  with  myth 
creation. At the very least, good stories need protagonists, 
antagonists,  tests  for  the  protagonist,  a  promise  of 
redemption, and a supporting cast of characters. Disrupting 
al Qaeda’s foundational myth may involve undermining the 
belief that we are the antagonists in the narrative bin Laden 
is  constructing.  Therefore,  either  we  can  undermine  the 
foundational myth being used to drive VNSA development, or 
we can construct an alternative myth that is a “better story” 
than the one being offered by the myth mongers. Examples 
of  myth  creation  in  fiction  include  the stories  told  by the 
rulers of Plato’s ideal city (the Republic) that were designed 
to  motivate  members  of  the  different  classes21 and  the 
foundational  myths  that  supported  the  violent  actions  of 
both the  Hutus  and  the  Tutsis  during  the  Rwandan 
massacres of 1994.22
For  a  more  benign  example,  consider  the  conscious 
mythmaking  that  has  taken  place  in  Israel,  such  as  the 
“transformation  of  the  1920  defense  of  a  new  Jewish 
settlement in Tel Hai into a national myth,” turning a defeat 
into a symbol of national revival.23
Closely  related  to  myth  making  is  the  strategy  of 
creating  alternative  exemplars.  Members  of  an  at-risk 
population  often  become  at  risk  because  of  a  failure  to 
identify with a member of a non-violent non-state actor or a 
member  of  the  government  or  occupying  power.  VNSA 
21
2
. See PLATO, REPUBLIC, at bk. 4 (Robin Waterfield trans., 1993).
22 . For more about these myths, see RYSZARD KAPUSCINSKI, THE SHADOW OF THE 
SUN:  MY AFRICAN LIFE 165-82  (2001).  Owing to  the mostly  fabricated early 
history of the region, the Tutsis were viewed as being pastoral patrons (i.e., 
rulers) who preside over their clients (i.e., slaves), the Hutu agriculturalists. 
Under  colonial  rule  by  both  the  Germans  and  the  Belgians,  this 
foundational  myth  was  reinforced,  with  separate  identity  cards  being 
issued for both peoples. The Belgians even went so far as to argue that the 
Tutsi  were,  racially speaking,  more closely related to white  people,  and 
were  hence  a  superior  race,  putting  in  place  a  quite  different  but 
nonetheless  related  foundational  myth.  Needless  to  say,  these  myths 
played a large part in the violence that erupted in 1994.  See CHRIS LOWE, 
AFRICA ACTION, TALKING ABOUT “TRIBE”: MOVING FROM STEREOTYPES TO ANALYSIS 2 (2008), 
available  at,  
http://www.africaaction.org/bp/documents/TalkingaboutTribeFeb 
2008Update_001.pdf.
23 . YAEL ZERUBAVEL, RECOVERED ROOTS: COLLECTIVE MEMORY AND THE MAKING OF ISRAELI 
NATIONAL TRADITION, at back cover (1995).
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“identity entrepreneurs” can exploit  existing ethnic,  racial, 
economic,  or  social  political  differences  by  elevating 
someone  who  shares  the  same  characteristics  as  the 
exploited class to a position of prestige or power. Members 
of the at-risk group then come to identify with that exemplar 
and  may  feel  compelled  to  adopt  the  violent  strategies 
advocated  by  the  exemplar’s  VNSA.  Creating  alternative 
exemplars  that  share  the  salient  characteristics  of  the 
exemplar but who do not advocate violence or who can show 
the way towards a non-violent solution to the issues that are 
fueling VNSA emergence help interrupt the VNSA life cycle. 
Alternative exemplar creation may involve symbolic acts on 
the part of the government that tap those elements of “hot” 
emotion-laden  cognition  and  heuristics  and  biases 
mentioned earlier. An example of the alternative exemplar 
creation  strategy  in  action  is  the  praise  and  warm 
endorsement heaped upon John Garang, the leader of  the 
Sudanese  guerrilla  faction  of  the  Sudanese  People’s 
Liberation Army (SPLA), during his visit to Washington just 
before Christmas of 1995. Such endorsement was critical for 
the recruitment and logistics boost the SPLA received that 
enabled  Garang’s  forces  to  recapture  crucial  cities  in 
southern  Sudan  soon  thereafter.24 In  this  case,  we 
encouraged the growth of a VNSA by cultivating an exemplar 
saliently different from the leaders of the Sudanese regime.
An  alternate  affective  strategy  includes  fomenting  a 
metaphor  shift  that  affects  the  way  in  which  at-risk 
populations  or  members  of  a  VNSA  frame  their  actions. 
Given the power of  metaphor to shape human thought,  it 
should  come  as  no  surprise  that  the  shifting  metaphors 
people use to frame worldviews and guide decisions could 
cause a change in their reasoning. For example, to convince 
someone  that  “cluster  of  cells”  is  a  more  appropriate 
metaphor for an unborn embryo than “young human” may 
very  well  change  their  stand  on  the  issue  of  abortion.25 
Shifting  metaphors  requires  making  connections  between 
the way people presently view a situation or issue and the 
24
2
. BILL BERKELEY, THE GRAVES ARE NOT YET FULL: RACE, TRIBE AND POWER IN THE HEART 
OF AFRICA 224–25 (2001).
25 . See Paul Churchland, Toward a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral  
Virtues, in THE FOUNDATIONS OF COGNITIVE SCIENCE 77, 85–86 (João Branquinho ed., 
2001); William D. Casebeer, Moral Cognition and its Neural Constituents, 4 
NATURE REVS. NEUROSCIENCE 840, 840–46 (2003); WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, NATURAL ETHICAL 
FACTS: EVOLUTION, CONNECTIONISM, AND MORAL COGNITION 101–25 (2003).
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way you would like them to frame the situation or issue.26 
The common refrain, “one man’s terrorist is another man’s 
freedom fighter,” is a simple example of metaphor shift; if 
you can make the charge of “you are not a freedom fighter,” 
or  “you  are  not  actually  crusading  on  behalf  of  true 
Muslims,” stick, you go a long way toward defusing certain 
narratives.27 Even the patriotic revolutionaries participating 
in  the  Boston  Tea  Party  were  viewed  as  criminals  and 
dangerous  insurrectionists  by  many  of  their  fellow 
colonialists. Manipulation of existing identities (e.g., national, 
tribal, ethnic) is yet another affective strategy.28 This does 
not necessarily require creating new foundational myths or 
alternate  exemplars;  instead,  skillful  use  of  existing 
cleavages can decrease a VNSA’s stock of negative entropy. 
This is the “flip side” of the identity entrepreneur’s efforts 
that are often part of the genesis and growth of VNSA. For 
example,  the  Masaai  warriors  in  Tanzania  have  skillfully 
manipulated  existing  identity  cleavages  to  elevate  the 
warrior aspect of Masaai culture over other aspects such as 
pastoral  herder  or  Tanzanian  citizen.  This  involved  the 
creation of camps for young Masaai males, where they learn 
compelling stories, foundational myths about ancient Masaai 
warriors,  and  hunting  and  combat  skills.  The  Tanzanian 
government,  if  it  wished,  could  exploit  other  aspects  of 
Masaai history, including the fact that their lineage includes 
an important pastoral element, to de-emphasize the violent 
aspects of Masaai culture to ensure they remain a peaceful 
non-state actor.29
For an Islamic example, consider Bassam Tibi’s position 
that moderate members of the Islamic faith (especially Sufis) 
could best confront malignant forms of fundamentalism by 
emphasizing  strands  in  Islamic  narrative  history  that 
26
2
. See FAUCONNIER & TURNER, supra note 7, at 337–38 (discussing how to 
enable “frame shifts”).
27
2
. Consider, for instance, the conceptual shift that occurs in members 
of the Israeli army when they start thinking about Palestinian teenagers as 
being  an  enemy rather  than  a  peer.  See EYAL BEN-ARI,  MASTERING SOLDIERS: 
CONFLICT, EMOTIONS, AND THE ENEMY IN AN ISRAELI MILITARY UNIT 76–78 (1998).
28
2
. For an excellent discussion of this process, see DANIEL BYMAN, KEEPING 
THE PEACE: LASTING SOLUTIONS TO ETHNIC CONFLICTS 100–24 (2002).
29
2
. Interview with Masaai nationals in Tanzania (June 2002). For more 
background  on  Tanzania’s  history,  as  well  as  detail  on  the  Rwandan 
situation,  see  CIVIL WARS IN AFRICA:  ROOTS AND RESOLUTION 238–43,  246–48 
(Tanzania), 53–86 (Rwanda) (Taisier Ali & Robert Matthews eds., 1999).
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highlight very different exemplars. As he says:
I am a Sufi, but in my mind I subscribe to aql/reason, and in this I 
follow the Islamic rationalism of Ibn  Rushd/Averroës.  Moreover,  I 
read  Islamic  scripture,  as  any  other,  in  the  light  of  history,  a 
practice I learned from the work of the great Islamic philosopher of 
history  Ibn  Khaldun.  The  Islamic  source  most  pertinent  to  [my] 
intellectual  framework .  .  .  is  the ideal  of  al-madina al-fadila/the 
perfect  state,  as  outlined  in  the  great  thought  of  the  Islamic 
political  philosopher  al-Farabi.  Al-Farabi’s  “perfect  state”  has  a 
rational,  that  is,  secular  order  and  is  best  administered  by  a 
reason-oriented philosopher. .  .  .  A combination of these Islamic 
sources, the Sufi love of Ibn ´Arabi, the reason-based orientation of 
Ibn Rushd, the historicizing thought of Ibn Khaldun, and al-Farabi’s 
secular  concept  of  order,  seem  to  me  the  best  combination  of 
cornerstones for an Islamic enlightenment.30
To  get  yet  more  concrete,  consider  the  elements  of 
typical narratives offered by Islamic insurgents. For Vlahos, 
those included a heroic journey and mythic figure, an epic 
historical  struggle,  a  charge  of  renewal,  and  a  mystic 
interpretation  of  history.31 Any  action32 we  can  take  that 
would  decrease  the  probability  that  bin  Laden  could  be 
interpreted as a hero, that diminishes the likelihood that we 
could be cast as the antagonist in a historical struggle, that 
makes it seem less likely “resisting” us would lead to Islamic 
renewal,  or  that  diminishes  bin  Laden’s  ability  to  sell  a 
mythical interpretation of the struggle, would be effective at 
defusing the power of  the story.  For  example, part of  the 
reason  why  Brigadier  General  David  Petraeus’  101st 
Airborne has been so successful in northern Iraq has to do 
with  the  careful  manner  in  which  they  have  carried  out 
police raids, going so far as to rebuild house doors busted 
down even when those doors were on houses that did in fact 
contain insurgent weapons. This has done much to disarm 
the justice frames at play in the story-sphere there.33
Or consider Juergensmeyer’s list:34 Is the struggle over 
basic identity? Is losing the struggle unthinkable? Can the 
struggle not be won in real terms? Are there actions we can 
take or speech acts we can engage in, that lessen the threat 
30
3
. BASSAM TIBI, THE CHALLENGE OF FUNDAMENTALISM, at xv (1998).
31 . VLAHOS, supra note 16, at 8.
32 . Any action includes a  speech act. Merely saying things differently 
might be enough in many cases.
33 . Phone interview with Brigadier Gen. David Petraeus, 101st Airborne 
Div. (2005).
34 . JUERGENSMEYER, supra note 18, at 164–66.
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our presence poses to Islamic identity? Can we assure the 
populations  of  a  country  or  region we are  occupying  that 
successful  occupation  would  not  imply  the  destruction  of 
cherished  values?  Can  we  engage  in  “cultural  confidence 
building measures” that assure target populations they can 
achieve  many  of  their  goals  even  within  the  context  of 
occupation  or  reconstruction?  These  actions  may  be  as 
simple  as  avoiding  certain  terms  in  our  speech  (e.g., 
“crusade”),  while  other  actions  required  to  see  a  story 
through may be quite complicated.
In many cases the tactical  success achieved by taking 
action  we  know  may  feed  a  malignant  narrative  may 
nonetheless justify them. Even then, we should be aware of 
the impact our actions are having on the “telling of stories” 
in the backstreets and communities of at-risk populations so 
that we can, where possible, mitigate any negative upshot.
6. A SIMPLE EVALUATIVE MECHANISM: ARISTOTLE’S 
RHETORICAL MODEL
In practice, effective counter-narrative strategy requires 
understanding  the  components  and  content  of  the  story 
being  told  to  predict  how  they  influence  the  action  of  a 
target  audience.  In  other  words,  we  need a  sophisticated 
understanding of strategic rhetoric. This is difficult to come 
by. Nonetheless, even well-worn and simple models of this 
process,  such  as  that  offered  by  the  ancient  Greek 
philosopher Aristotle in his  Rhetoric, can be very useful for 
structuring  our  thinking.  Aristotle  would  have  us  evaluate 
three  components  of  a  narrative  relative  to  a  target 
audience: (1) What is the ethos of the speaker or deliverer? 
(2) What is the  logos of the message being delivered? (3) 
Does the message contain appropriate appeals to pathos?35 
Consideration  of  ethos  would  emphasize  the  need  to 
establish credible channels of communication, conveyed by 
actors  who have the character and reputation required to 
ensure receipt  and belief  of  the message.  “You  have bad 
ethos”  is  merely  another  way  of  saying  “You  will  not  be 
believed by the target audience because they do not think 
you  are  believable.”  Consideration  of  logos  involves  the 
rational  elements  of  the  narrative:  Is  it  logical?  Is  it 
35
3
. Aristotle,  Rhetoric,  in THE RHETORIC AND THE POETICS OF ARISTOTLE 24–25 § 
1356a (W. Rhys Roberts & Ingram Bywater trans., 1954).
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consistent enough to be believed? Does it contain (from the 
target’s perspective) non-sequiturs and forms of reasoning 
not normally used? Finally, pathos deals with the emotional 
content of the story. Does the story cue appropriate affective 
and emotive systems in the human brain? Does it appeal to 
emotion in a way that engages the whole person and that 
increases  the  chances  the  story  will  actually  motivate 
action?
Thomas Coakley  summarizes  the Aristotelian  model  in 
his paper on the Peruvian counter-terrorism experience:
Ethos:  these are appeals the speaker makes to the audience to 
establish  credibility.  Essentially,  ethos  is  what  a  speaker  uses—
implicitly or explicitly—to ensure that the audience can trust him or 
her. An example in advertising is an athlete endorsing an athletic 
product. In war, examples include a history of adherence to LOAC 
[Laws of Armed Conflict] and an assertiveness of willpower.
Pathos:  these are appeals  the speaker  makes to the audience’s 
emotions. An example of this would be an advertisement for tires 
that emphasizes safety by portraying an infant cradled within the 
circle of the tire. In war, pathos might be displayed by showing the 
“average”  guy  on  the  adversary’s  side  that  the  US  position  is 
better.
Logos: these  are  appeals  to  facts.  More  doctors  recommend 
toothpaste X than any other brand. In war, there is no greater logic 
than firepower, but as insurgencies demonstrated throughout the 
twentieth century, firepower (logos) alone will  not win wars, and 
will win very few arguments.36
Some of these Aristotelian considerations will be affected 
by structural elements of the story37; others will be affected 
36
3
. William  D.  Casebeer,  The  Stories  Markets  Tell:  Affordances  for 
Ethical Behavior in Free Exchange, in MORAL MARKETS: THE CRITICAL ROLE OF VALUES 
IN THE ECONOMY 1, 8 (Paul J. Zak ed., 2008) (quoting  THOMAS COAKLEY, INST.  FOR 
NAT’L SECURITY STUD.  THE ARGUMENT AGAINST TERROR:  THE PERUVIAN EXPERIENCE, 
GLOBALIZATION,  AND US  POLICY (2003)),  available  at 
http://press.princeton.edu/chapters/s8657.html.
37 . Structural elements include whether the story is coherent, simple 
enough to be processed, can it be remembered, is it easy to transmit, and 
if believed, will it motivate appropriate action? Indeed, some structure and 
content of stories may cause narratives to act as primary reinforcers—that 
is, just like food, drugs, or sex. A fascinating neurobiological exploration of 
this process of successful “cultural messaging” is being carried out by the 
author  and neuroscientists  such as  Read Montague,  head of  the Baylor 
College  of  Medicine’s  Human  Neuroimaging  Laboratory.  Innovative  new 
techniques such as “hyperscanning” allow social cognition to be studied in 
vitro at the neural level using functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging. See 
generally Baylor  College  of  Medicine,  Human  Neuroimaging  Laboratory, 
http.www.hnl.bcm. tmc.edu/hyperScan.html (last visited May 19, 2008).
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by content.38
Ascertaining how these issues interact to ensure success 
in counter-narrative efforts is a complex process. In general, 
though,  consideration  of  these  ideas  leads  to  this  non-
exhaustive  list  of  basic  strategic  principles  for  the 
formulation  and  application  of  counter-narrative  strategy, 
some of which we have already briefly discussed.
7. NARRATIVE “STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES,” AND SOME 
COMPLICATIONS
Effective counter-narrative strategy will be guided by the 
following strategic principles:
(1)  Target  audience characteristics are critical.  Formu-
lating a narrative without understanding the culture of the 
population  you  wish  to  influence  is  at  best  a  recipe  for 
ineffectiveness and at worst can backfire.
(2)  Darwinian  competitiveness  counts.  Stories  will  be 
more likely to be received and understood if they are fit for 
the  environment  in  which  they  are  expected  to  flourish. 
Some  basic  considerations  include  whether  or  not  stories 
take  advantage  of  heuristics  and  biases  (e.g.,  since 
memorable events are easier for a target audience to recall, 
memorable events should form the skeleton of a story).
(3)  Aristotle  is  better  than  nothing.  Considerations  of 
ethos, logos, and pathos (E/L/P) are simplistic. But they are 
better  than  not  bothering to  evaluate  the  storyline  at  all. 
Relative to a target population, an E/L/P analysis can provide 
a baseline for predicting and controlling narrative flow over 
the course of a conflict.
(4)  There  are  two  important  story  sets:  the  ones  our 
adversary  is  telling,  and the one being told  implicitly  and 
explicitly  by  us. Terrorist  organizations  have  instrumental 
incentives to “get out the story” that form a necessary part 
of  their  continued  survival  and  enables  their  goal 
achievement.  We  need  to  consider  not  only  whether  our 
38
3
. Content elements include: does the narrative resonate with target 
audiences,  is  the  protagonist  of  the  story  a  member  of  the  target 
audience’s  in-group,  and is  the antagonist  of  the story  a  member  of  a 
hated out-group? It may very well be that some aspects of narrative are 
evaluated  in  exactly  the  same  way  that  theories  in  the  sciences  are 
evaluated: according to their simplicity, output power, explanatory power, 
justificatory  power,  coherence,  breadth,  clarity  and  psychological 
plausibility.
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story is being told well, but also how both our actions and 
storytelling  affect  the  plausibility  of  the  stories  they  are 
introducing into the environment.  To do this  well  requires 
getting inside the “narrative  OODA-loop” of  our adversary 
(where  OODA  is  an  acronym  which  stands  for  Observe-
Orient-Decide-Act, a description of the basic decision-cycle 
for  organizations  first  postulated  by  US  Air  Force  Colonel 
John Boyd).
(5)  Tactical  success  may  require  overriding  strategic 
story considerations. While grand counter-terrorism strategy 
will  require counter-narrative considerations for success,  it 
may very well be that strategic story considerations will be 
overridden in many circumstances by demands for tactical 
or short-term success. Understanding this tension will enable 
us to build  stories  that  will  be only minimally  affected by 
such reversals.
(6) Stories with firewalls are better than stories without 
defenses.  Narratives  need  to  come  equipped  with  an 
immune system. Some stories are more resilient than others 
to  changes  in  the  environment;  the  best  of  stories  make 
sense—to  use  Karl  Popper’s  language,39 it  will  fail  to  be 
falsified.  We should think about how to  firewall  stories  to 
prevent their destruction or cooption.
(7) Adaptability and flexibility are important. The story 
environment  is  fluid,  and  stories  should  be  too.  While  it 
would  undermine  our  ethos  to  change  stories  often,  our 
logos may demand that we do so at times. Anticipating this, 
we should create grand narratives that have some built-in 
adaptability  and  flexibility.  Protagonists  and  antagonists 
change.  Basic  plot  lines  shift.  Culmination  points  move. 
Critical  identities  are  fluid.  This  environmental  uncertainty 
makes adaptability in stories even more important.
Application  of  these  strategic  principles  for  story 
formulation is difficult. At any given time, there are myriad 
target  audiences.  We can  expect  their  reactions  to  be 
shaped  dynamically.  For  example,  a  grand  narrative  that 
was perfectly plausible before Abu Ghraib may be rendered 
perfectly inert afterwards. A few critical slips by key public 
representatives  may  entrench  an  antagonistic  narrative, 
leaving no choice but to abandon a counter-narrative put in 
39
3
. KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40–42 (Basic Books, Inc. 
1961) (1959); KARL R. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC 
KNOWLEDGE 256 (1962).
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place to combat it. Understanding the temporal mechanics 
and  dynamics  of  story  flow  will  be  an  ad  hoc  business. 
Recognizing this fact, however, and considering what impact 
this has for our plans, programs, and policies is far superior 
to  the  alternative  of  letting  our adversaries  occupy  the 
narrative high ground.
8. INSTITUTIONAL IMPLICATIONS
At the least, doing the things discussed above requires 
an  awareness  of  the  characteristics  of  target  audiences, 
knowledge  of  the  narratives  and  stories  at  play  in  their 
culture,  a  model  of  how  actions  interact  with  the 
characteristics of those narratives to produce certain results 
(even  the  relatively  mundane  Aristotelian  model  just 
discussed  is  a  fine  place  to  start),  and  a  willingness  to 
coordinate actions inter-governmentally to present a unified 
narrative front to the target audience.
The  organizations  and  processes  needed  to  do  this 
successfully are not (alas) in place. Cultural intelligence is 
only now getting off the ground. Awareness of the cultural 
and  societal  impact  of  occupation  is  being  enhanced 
systematically  relatively  late  in  the  game.  Where  in  the 
government’s  national  security  apparatus  “narrative 
unification” and “story consistency checks” would take place 
is  not  clear.40 Given  extant  concerns  about  the  misuse of 
psychological operations, and the public relations disaster of 
previous efforts in this  direction,41 this  lack of  institutional 
inertia  is  perhaps understandable.  Even so,  we are slowly 
coming  to  realize  the  importance  of  counter-narrative 
strategies,  as the September 2004 Defense Science Board 
report  on  strategic  communi-cations  made  clear  with  its 
strong final recommendation:
The Task Force recommends that the Under Secretary of Defense 
for Policy and the Joint Chiefs of Staff ensure that all military plans 
and  operations  have  appropriate  strategic  communication 
components, ensure collaboration with the Department of State’s 
diplomatic  missions and with theater  security  cooperation plans; 
and  extend  U.S.  STRATCOM’s  and  U.S.  SOCOM’s  Information 
40
4
. Presumably  at  high  levels  such  as  within  the  National  Security 
Council, or high-level working groups within the State Department.
41 . The  Pentagon  considered  an  “Office  of  Strategic  Influence”  but 
hastily  shelved  the  idea.  Eric  Schmitt  and  James  Dao,  A  ‘Damaged’ 
Information  Office  Is  Declared  Closed  by  Rumsfeld,  N.Y.  TIMES,  Feb.  27, 
2002, at A1.
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Operations  responsibilities  to  include  DoD  support  for  public 
diplomacy.  The  Department  should  triple  current  resources 
(personnel & funding) available to combatant commanders for DoD 
support to public diplomacy and reallocate Information Operations 
funding within U.S. STRATCOM for expanded support for strategic 
communication programs.42
9. THE IMPORTANCE OF NARRATIVES
Having in place effective counter-narrative strategies will 
not be a panacea. Nonetheless, if military force is to play the 
appropriate  role  in  our  national  security  strategy  and the 
“Global  War  on  Terror,”  we  need  a  more  comprehensive 
understanding of how a failure to tell good stories can lead 
to  an  increased  risk  of  insurgencies,  violent  social 
movements, and terrorist action. While this Article has been 
far too brief to provide a comprehensive understanding of 
the relationship between stories, identity, and violent action, 
I hope it has at least made plausible the case that we need 
to think much more carefully about the relationship between 
this  rhetorical  Clausewitzian  trinity43 and  state  power.  A 
grand counter-terrorism strategy that actually produces the 
results  we  desire  rides  on  such  a  subtle  psychologically 
informed understanding of narratives and terror.
Narratives  also  play  a  critical  role  in  several  other 
cultural phenomena relevant to the study of terrorism and 
insurgency, including cultivation of  shared group identities 
and surrogate consciousness. This exploration is the subject 
for the final section of this Article.
10.FRAMING AND ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE
There  is  little  doubt  that  framing  processes—those 
processes responsible for influencing how an actor views the 
world,  such  as  the  narratives  discussed  earlier—play  an 
important role in creating and sustaining social mobilization 
42
4
. DEFENSE SCI. BD., REPORT OF THE DEFENSE SCIENCE BOARD TASK FORCE ON STRATEGIC 
COMMUNICATION 9  (2004),  available  at http://www.acq. 
osd.mil/dsb/reports/2004-09-Strategic_Communication.pdf.  The  report  is 
well worth reading in its entirety.
43 . CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ, ON WAR 89 (Michael Howard & Peter Paret eds. & 
trans.,  1984)  (1976)  (“As  a  total  phenomenon its  dominant  tendencies 
always make war a paradoxical trinity—composed of primordial violence, 
hatred, and enmity, which are to be regarded as a blind natural force; of 
the play of chance and probability with which the creative spirit is free to 
roam; and of its element of subordination, as an instrument of policy, which 
makes it subject to reason alone.”).
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processes in the Middle East. More controversially, framing 
processes  are  also  critical  for  sustaining  organizational 
efficiency.  When  movements  spawn  formal  organizations, 
those organizations will take advantage of some of the same 
processes used by mobilization  leaders  so as  to shore up 
support  from  actors  interested  in  seeing  the  organization 
achieve  its  goals.  Moreover,  when  organizations  find 
themselves in turbulent and problematic environments, they 
may  shift  their  framing  processes  so  as  to  cultivate  new 
stakeholder  relationships  and  broaden  the  base  of  those 
willing to provide material and moral support. Often, this will 
involve expanding the goals of  the organization,  providing 
existing  members  reason  to  support  these  new  goals  by 
developing a sense of  shared responsibility for the fate of 
those  affected  by  these  new  objectives—in  short,  by 
cultivating  “surrogate  consciousness”  in  their  traditional 
membership.
Such, I argue, has been the fate of Lebanon’s Hizballah. 
Here I argue for a series of linked hypotheses, all germane to 
the  concept  of  strategically  important  culture.  First,  I 
distinguish  the  concept  of  surrogate  consciousness  from 
related  psychological  processes  involved  in  framing. 
Surrogate  consciousness  arises  from  the  conjunction  of 
empathetic responses with a “thin” sense of shared identity 
(especially  identities  that  arise  from  a  recognition  of 
common  fate)  even  in  the  face  of  obvious  and  self-
acknowledged out-group distinctions.  This is different from 
the activation of either empathy or identity alone, and may 
deserve to be recognized as a significant category (akin to 
oppositional consciousness) in the mobilization literature, as 
it  can  play  a  critical  role  in  broadening  an  organization’s 
base of support. Development of surrogate consciousness is 
enhanced by consideration of the narrative elements of the 
framing process. Second, by analyzing official documents of 
Hizballah  and  the  rhetoric  of  Hizballah  leaders  such  as 
Sheikh Hussein Nasrallah and Grand Ayatollah Muhammad 
Hussein  Fadlallah—focusing  in  particular  on  how  this 
verbiage  has  changed  over  time—the  section  provides 
evidence that the Party of God has broadened its goals; this 
in  turn  has  led  to  narrative  efforts  designed  to  boost 
surrogate  consciousness  in  the  Shi’a  of  Lebanon  for  the 
plight of Palestinians in the occupied territories. Third, and 
only  very  briefly,  I  argue  that  whether  this  is  a  positive 
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development remains an open question; on the one hand, 
these  developments  increase  the  chances  Hizballah  will 
continue to develop a bona fide constituency and moderate 
its goals so they become irredentist rather than millenarian, 
making it all the more likely those goals can be achieved by 
peaceful political means. This may have the pleasant upshot 
of marginalizing the militant wing of Hizballah. On the other 
hand,  if  Palestinians  are  unable  to  reach  accommodation 
with  Israel  through non-violent  means (such as the peace 
process),  the  surrogate  consciousness  could  retrench 
Hizballah’s  militant  elements,  which  would  not  be  a 
favorable  development.  This  is  an  ambitious  set  of 
hypotheses to develop and defend in part of one article. This 
Article’s aim is to provide enough explanation and evidence 
to at least make them plausible so as to motivate a more 
rigorous research agenda.
11.SURROGATE CONSCIOUSNESS
In  general,  mobilization—be  it  for  peaceful  or  violent 
collective action—is thought to happen at the intersections 
of political opportunities, mobilizing structures, and framing 
processes.44 There  must  be  some  form  of  political 
opportunity (or  lack  thereof)—for  instance,  a  state 
crackdown on a spontaneous protest might open the political 
door  for  a  full-fledged  movement.  Mobilizing  structures 
provide resources for movements to grow and expand—for 
example, pre-existing social networks may serve as funnels 
for  financial  support  for  a  nascent  movement.  Finally, 
framing processes can (among many other things) motivate 
individuals  to  join  nascent  movements,  groups  and 
organizations, and may reinforce certain identities so as to 
make  mobilization  easier.45 Critical  to  the  importance  of 
44
4
. See, e.g.,  COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON SOCIAL MOVEMENTS:  POLITICAL 
OPPORTUNITIES,  MOBILIZING STRUCTURES,  AND CULTURAL FRAMINGS,  (Doug McAdam et al. 
eds.,  1996);  Doug McAdam et  al.,  Toward an Integrated Perspective on 
Social  Movements and Revolution,  in COMPARATIVE POLITICS:  RATIONALITY,  CULTURE 
AND STRUCTURE 142 (Mark Irving Lichback & Alan S. Zuckerman eds., 1997).
45 . “Framing”  probably  really  serves  as  a  placeholder  for  all  non-
rational psychological processes involved in mobilization (the sociology and 
political  science  literature  tends  to  call  these  “subjective  processes,” 
though this is a bit  limiting as the psychological  processes undergirding 
these  phenomena  need  have  no  experiential  or  phenomenological 
component, and are in many cases richly social). I suspect that there are 
more psychological processes worthy of consideration than those identified 
in the extant literature.
WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, "IDENTITY, CULTURE AND STORIES: EMPATHY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM ," 9(2) MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 653-688 (2008).
676 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 9:2
frames is  the notion that  they can  resonate to  greater  or 
lesser degrees with target audiences.46
Generally,  social  psychological  facts  (such  as  the 
development of group identity or awareness of one’s self as 
a  part  of  a  larger  collective)  are  most  likely  to  intervene 
upon the mobilization process via framing effects. Consider 
the  idea  of  oppositional  consciousness.47 Oppositional 
consciousness  is  one  process  whereby  members  of  a 
persecuted or oppressed group become aware of themselves 
as  group  members for  the  purposes  of  spurring  action. 
Oppositional consciousness—“an empower-ing mental state 
that  prepares  members  of  an  oppressed  group  to  act  to 
undermine,  reform  or  overthrow  a  system  of  human 
domination”—involves,  according  to  Jane  Mansbridge, 
“identifying  with  members  of  a  subordinate  group, 
identifying  injustices  done  to  that  group,  opposing  these 
injustices, and seeing the group as having a shared interest 
in  ending  or  diminishing  those  injustices.”48 Framing  will 
affect all these facets of oppositional consciousness. Justice 
frames,  for  example,  will  make  salient  to  a  group  the 
injustices being done to them, while motivational frames will 
increase the likelihood a member of the affected group will 
take action to end the injustice.
Surrogate consciousness is similar to, but separate from, 
oppositional  consciousness.49 Like  oppositional 
consciousness, surrogate consciousness will be affected by 
framing.  It  will  involve  some  of  the  same  processes  as 
oppositional  consciousness,  and in many regards functions 
just as it does—to prepare members of a group for action. 
But  unlike oppositional  consciousness,  surrogate 
46
4
. See generally D. A. Snow & R. Benford, Ideology, Frame Resonance, 
and Participant Mobilization,  in 1  FROM STRUCTURE TO ACTION 197, 197–217 (B. 
Klandermans, H. Kriesi & S. Tarrow eds., 1988).
47 . See Aldon  Morris  &  Naomi  Braine,  Social  Movements  and 
Oppositional Consciousness, in OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS: THE SUBJECTIVE ROOTS OF 
SOCIAL PROTEST 20 (J. Mansbridge & A. Morris eds., 2001).
48 . Jane  Mansbridge,  The  Making  of  Oppositional  Consciousness,  in 
OPPOSITIONAL CONSCIOUSNESS:  THE SUBJECTIVE ROOTS OF SOCIAL PROTEST 4–5  (J. 
Mansbridge & A. Morris eds., 2001).
49 . In order to confirm that surrogate consciousness was not already a 
commonly used concept in the mobilization literature, I skimmed multiple 
seminal  articles  from the  framing  and  identity  bodies  of  work.  Also,  a 
Google search turned up no academic uses of the phrase, nor did a JSTOR 
search  turn  up  any  salient  references.  My  apologies  to  the  original 
discoverer if the phrase turns out to exist in the prior art.
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consciousness involves action by members of an out-group 
on  behalf  of another  group  that  is  being  persecuted. 
Oppositional  consciousness  involves  the  development  of 
empathy,  but  such  empathy  is  shared  only  with  in-group 
members (indeed, this is what makes it oppositional rather 
than merely generally empathetic). In the case of surrogate 
consciousness, however, empathy is developed for another 
group  even when one recognizes that one is not in fact a 
member of that group.
To  summarize,  according  to  our  nascent  theory, 
surrogate  consciousness  arises  from  the  conjunction  of 
empathetic responses with a very shallow sense of shared 
identity (especially identities that arise from recognition of 
common  fate,  which  is  probably  the  identity  generating 
mechanism  which  generates  the  thinnest,  most  violable 
sense  of  identity50)  whilst  nonetheless  recognizing  the 
existence of obvious out-group distinctions.51 Some empirical 
50
5
. See generally Leonie Huddy, Group Identity and Political Cohesion, 
in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY (David  Sears  et  al.  eds.,  2003) 
(reviewing major theories of the development of group identity).  On the 
whole,  social  context  is  critically  important  for  racial  and  ethnic 
acculturation vis-à-vis group identity.  This is  no surprise,  as there is  an 
entire theory (called “social  learning theory”) dedicated to the role that 
social  and group interaction  plays  in  the  development  of  attitudes  and 
skills.  Social  learning  theory  was  most  comprehensively  articulated  by 
Albert Bandura in the 1960s and 1970s. Bandura placed special emphasis 
on  how  new  behavior  is  acquired  through  observational  learning  via 
cognitive processes. Social learning did not require that there be rewards 
and punishments for learned behavior to occur (as in the neo-behaviorist 
paradigm that dominated cognitive science in the early twentieth century); 
rather, all that was required were “the minimal components of attention to 
a behavioral sequence, retention of its form, and the ability to reproduce 
the  behavioral  sequence.”  Shelly  E.  Taylor,  The  Social  Being  in  Social 
Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 66 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. 
eds., 4th ed. 1998). The core components of personal  cum group identity 
are  learned,  on  this  picture,  and  such  behavior  as  prejudice  or 
discrimination  (or  even  a  willingness  to  resort  to  violence  to  solve 
problems) is transmitted through various social groups—primarily via story 
telling—because  children hear  and see  such attitudes  in  action  in  their 
peers,  parents,  and  authority  figures.  It  is  easy  to  see  how  the 
development  of  prejudice,  which  may  be  a  necessary  (though  not 
sufficient) condition for organized violence to be committed against out-
groups, is contingent upon cultural  and social  factors themselves tightly 
related to narratives.
51 . Huddy  points  out  that  the  four  major  theoretical  approaches 
regarding the construction of group identity (which consist of the cognitive 
approach, realistic interest approaches, social  identity theory, and social 
constructivist  theory)  all  make somewhat different predictions regarding 
sources of  commonality  and critical  issues around which members may 
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examples  may  help.  Steve  notices  that  homosexuals  are 
being  subtly  discriminated  against  in  my  neighborhood; 
despite the fact that Steve is a heterosexual, he nonetheless 
acts on the behalf of the gay community by attending gay 
pride parades and donating money to the International Gay 
and  Lesbian  Human  Rights  Commission,  perhaps  in  part 
because  he  fears  that  he—as  a  member  of  a  minority 
religion (let’s stipulate that Steve is a Christian Scientist)—
may eventually face the same persecution. This would be a 
classic case of acting out of surrogate consciousness.
12.HIZBALLAH: A POTTED HISTORY
The  task  for  this  section  will  be  to  demonstrate  that 
Hizballah has used different framing devices in their rhetoric 
in an attempt to develop surrogate consciousness in their 
traditional constituency for the purposes of expanding their 
base. Perhaps they hope to eventually be able to appeal to 
the  members  of  the  group  on  whose  behalf  they  have 
mobilize. Huddy,  supra note  50, at 518–21. A thumbnail sketch of these 
approaches will help us understand her conclusion. The cognitive approach 
to  formation  of  group  identity  emphasizes  the  importance  of  self-
perception  in  the  development  of  cohesive  groups:  individuals  become 
group members because they identify with the group and wish to emulate 
typical  group  members.  Id.  Realistic  interest  approaches stress  the 
common interests  that groups share and advance; common fate is thus 
especially critical. If all of Islam is threatened, and we are Muslims, then it 
is more likely that we will become cohesive so as to achieve the common 
objective of protecting the shared interests of our group. Id. Social identity 
theorists emphasize  the  importance  of  symbolic  interactions  between 
groups  and  potential  members;  group  members  endorse  group 
memberships  because  of  a  need  to  achieve  a  positive  sense  of  social 
identity  that  will  differentiate  their  own  group  from  others.  Id.  Social 
constructivism takes social identity one step further: concepts derive their 
meaning from social  practices;  this theory stresses how social  identities 
form even  among strangers  so  long as  enough shared interactions can 
occur to generate the construction of the group as a group. Huddy rightly 
notes that
The cognitive approach predicts cohesion among the members of 
any  salient  group;  realistic  interest  theory  confines  cohesion  to 
groups  whose  members  share  a  common  fate;  social  identity 
theory points to unity among widely stigmatized groups, such as 
low-status  ethnic  or  racial  groups,  religious  sects  (etc.),  whose 
members cannot easily pass as belonging to a higher status group; 
and  a  social  constructivist  perspective  predicts  cohesion  among 
members  who  share  a  common  understanding  of  group 
membership.
Id.  at  521.  I’ll  briefly  discuss  these  approaches  later  in  the  main  text. 
Resolving  the  tensions  between  these  various  theories  of  group 
identification is beyond the scope of this article.
WILLIAM D. CASEBEER, "IDENTITY, CULTURE AND STORIES: EMPATHY AND THE WAR ON TERRORISM ," 9(2) MINN. J.L. 
SCI. & TECH. 653-688 (2008).
2008] IDENTITY, CULTURE & STORIES 679
developed  surrogacy.  The  group  in  whom  surrogate 
consciousness  is  being  developed  includes  the  traditional 
subjects  of  Hizballah:  the  people  of  occupied  southern 
Lebanon,  especially  Shi’a.  The group on whose behalf  the 
consciousness is being developed includes Palestinians living 
in the occupied territories. Part of the reason why Hizballah 
is  taking  this  action  was  to  prepare  the  way  for  being 
acknowledged as a legitimate actor, not just in the Lebanese 
political scene but also in the larger Southwest Asian political 
arena, and not just for Shi’a,  but for all  groups that have 
faced injustice in the region—or so I hope to demonstrate in 
the next section.
Some background on Hizballah is in order. Hizballah is 
Arabic for “Party of God.”52 It is a Shi’a political organization 
that  has  a  militant  and  sometimes  terrorist  wing.53 
Aboriginally,  it  articulated  three  main  objectives: 
establishing a Shi’a state in Lebanon modeled directly upon 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, causing the destruction of Israel, 
and neutralizing U.S. influence in the region.54
In  the  realm  of  violent  militant  action,  Hizballah’s 
activities  have  included  several  high  profile  terrorist 
incidents. In addition to multiple kidnappings in the 1980s, 
the infamous Beirut truck bombing of U.S. Marines, the 1985 
hijacking  of  TWA  Flight  847,  and  attacks  on  Jewish 
community centers and buildings in Argentina in 1992 and 
1994, Hizballah launched a series of suicide bombings in the 
occupied territories.55 A pre-9/11 chart contained in an article 
by Ehud Sprinzak demonstrates how successfully Hizballah 
executed suicide bombings, being the second largest group 
in terms of aggregate attacks56 (though it is critical to note 
that  Hizballah  has  since  denounced  the  use  of  suicide 
bombings  following  their  involvement  with  them  in  the 
mid-1980s).
In order to carry out these attacks, Lebanese Hizballah 
52
5
. CFR.org, Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah), http://www.cfr.org/ 
publication/9155/hezbollah_aka_hizbollah_hizbullah.html  (last  visited  Mar. 
12, 2008).
53 . Id.
54 . Id.
55 . See generally BRUCE HOFFMAN,  RAND, REPORT NO.  R-378-USDP,  RECENT 
TRENDS AND FUTURE PROSPECTS OF IRANIAN SPONSORED INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM 15–34 
(1990), available at http://rand.org/pubs/ reports/2005/R3783.pdf.
56 . Ehud Sprinzak,  Rational Fanatics,  FOREIGN POL’Y, Sept.-Oct. 2000, at 
66, 69.
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has developed a large and robust organization. It consists of 
thousands  of  supporters  and  members,  and  hundreds  of 
terrorist operatives.57
This  infrastructure  developed  in  part  owing  to  the 
group’s ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran.58 In addition to 
the  obvious  ideological  commonalities  given  the  group’s 
revolutionary goals, Hizballah receives substantial  financial 
support  from  Iran.  Also,  the  Iranian  Revolutionary  Guard 
Corps  has  been  extensively  involved  in  training  and 
organizing Hizballah (their foundational  involvement in the 
early  1980s  was  critical  during  the  group’s  initial 
organization).  Via  a  series  of  Syrian  airfields,  Iran  has  air 
supply connections to the group.
Social  movement  theory  provides  us  with  insight  into 
how  the  conditions  for  Hizballah’s  genesis  developed  (in 
large  part,  as  a  reaction  to  the  Shah’s  program  of 
Westernization).  “Identity  entrepreneurs,”  such  as  the 
group’s spiritual leader Sheikh Fadlallah, were instrumental 
in establishing the organization and moving it through the 
growth phase. During maturity, the organization carried out 
militant action; however, as some of its realizable political 
goals were achieved, and as it gained a larger constituency 
via the provision of  social  services such as education and 
health care,  the organization broadened in  terms of  goals 
and functions. Eventually, Hizballah came to have a political 
face, and today the Secretary General of Hizballah is Sheik 
Nasrallah. Hizbollah is an active participant in the political 
life and processes of Lebanon, and its scope of operation is 
far beyond its initial militant one.59 In 1992, it participated in 
elections for the first time, winning twelve out of 128 seats in 
parliament.60 It won ten seats in 1996, and now holds eight.61
A  stakeholder  analysis  reveals  traceability  between 
developments  in  Hizballah  capacities  and  patronage  from 
one  of  the  major  stakeholders—Iran.  For  instance,  Imad 
57
5
. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE,  COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 251 
(2006),  available  at  http://fpc.state.gov/documents/ 
organization/29722.pdf.
58 . The Wikipedia entry on Hizballah is excellent and provides a good 
table  of  organization,  background,  and  historical  review.  Hezbollah, 
http://en. wikipedia.org/wiki/Hizballah (last visited Mar. 13, 2008).
59 . Id.
60
6
. Id.
61 . Id.  Hizbollah  won  fourteen  seats  in  the  2005  election.  CFR.org, 
supra note 52.
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Munniyah  came  to  dominate  the  security  apparatus  of 
Hizballah, and with his ties to Iranian intelligence, he almost 
certainly used organizational methods from Iran to radically 
increase  Hizballah’s  effectiveness  in  the  1980s.  Solid 
organizational  techniques  and  good  traceability  between 
activities  led  to  Hizballah’s  increasing  effectiveness  as  a 
militant organization, but it also led to their broadening into 
an organization with a legitimate political face as well.
Classic reinforcing actions were also taken by Hizballah 
as  they  eventually  became  the  largest  single  provider  of 
social services in southern Lebanon, displacing competitors 
such as the government of Lebanon (though in many cases 
the government welcomed Hizballah’s assumption of these 
responsibilities).  “Niche  construction”  activities  like  the 
delivery of health care and food aid are critically important, 
as  they  can  lead  to  the  development  of  a  stable 
constituency,  which  in  turn  may  help  moderate  an 
organization’s  more  militant  tendencies,62 as  I  will  briefly 
discuss later.
This  potted  and  all-too-brief  summary  of  Hizballah  is 
intended  to  establish  two  main  points:  first,  that  the 
organization’s  goals  have  broadened  as  time  has  passed, 
becoming  more  politically  realistic;  and  second,  that 
Hizballah has developed a bona fide political constituency, 
whom they represent both in the Lebanese parliament and 
regionally.  These  modifications  have required  Hizballah  to 
broaden its base, which in time has led to the articulation of 
a  new  narrative  designed  to  generate  surrogate 
consciousness. Before providing textual evidence for this last 
point,  a  detour  into  narrative  theory  will  help  provide 
foundations  for  understanding  tropes  and  themes 
emphasized in Hizballah’s media presence.63
Any of these aspects of narrative would be fascinating 
and  important  to  examine  in  detail.  The  next  few 
paragraphs,  however,  focus  on  the  relationship  between 
stories and identity mobilization, as this aspect is critical to 
62
6
. See THOMAS ET AL., supra note 19, at 80–83.
63 . Several of the following paragraphs are taken from portions of an 
article I co-authored with James Russell. William D. Casebeer & James A. 
Russell,  Storytelling  and Terrorism: Towards a  Comprehensive ‘Counter-
Narrative  Strategy’,  STRATEGIC INSIGHTS,  Mar.  2005,  http://www.ccc.nps. 
navy.mil/si/2005/Mar/casebeerMar05.asp.  Portions  used  in  the  next  few 
pages were written by me. My thanks to Troy Thomas for multiple insights 
related to this section.
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“narrative ecology.”
13.THE FORMATION OF IDENTITY AND SHIFTS IN HIZBALLAH 
RHETORIC
In order to understand how and why individuals in places 
like Lebanon eventually become members of Hizballah, we 
need  to  better  grasp  both  how  individual  identities  are 
formed and how they interact with groups and cultures to 
shape a sense of collective identity. The literature on both 
identity  formation  and  identity  interaction  is  voluminous; 
however,  some key points  from it  can usefully  inform our 
analysis.
Groups  of  individuals  that  feel  they  share  a  common 
fate, possess a common identity, face a common threat, or 
have communal needs, are abundant in most environments. 
In conditions of violence, where governments are failing to 
provide basic safety/security needs (think of Lebanon in the 
aftermath  of  the  civil  war),  these  sometimes  latent  or 
“weakly  felt”  identities  are  prone  to  even  greater 
mobilization, with the individual increasingly identifying with 
the competing identity group rather than the political state. 
That  is,  in  the right  kinds of  environments,  it  is  relatively 
easy  for  identity  entrepreneurs—the tellers  of  stories  that 
speak  to  questions  of  fundamental  identity—to  make 
headway in motivating people to act in defense of a group, 
or play a critical  role in a plot that includes the group as 
protagonist  and  some  other  power  as  antagonist.  This  is 
especially  the  case  when  we  are  told  certain  stories 
throughout the formative periods of our lives that can easily 
be recast to provoke a backlash to things like government 
failure, occupation, or reconstruction.64
The brief review of Hizballah’s history from a few pages 
ago gives us a priori reason to think the narratives they use 
to do things like shore up stakeholder support have evolved 
over the years. There is also textual and other media-based 
evidence  for  this  conclusion,  and  some  of  the  narratives 
seem  to  have  the  purpose  of  creating  surrogate 
consciousness. Consider first an interview with Fadlallah (the 
spiritual  leader  for  Hizballah)  from  a  1987  issue  of  the 
64
6
. See generally  TROY THOMAS,  ET AL.,  WARLORDS RISING:  CONFRONTING VIOLENT 
NON-STATE ACTORS (2005) (providing literature review). Of note, in the right 
circumstances,  most  any  belief  system  can  be  radicalized  (Christian, 
Jewish, secular, etc.).
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Journal  of  Palestine  Studies.  In  the  interview,  Fadlallah 
discusses  the  tensions  between  Palestinians  and  Shi’a  in 
Southern Lebanon in the early 1980s, openly acknowledging 
that  “there was political,  material  and spiritual  weariness; 
and chaos dominated the south as a result of the disorderly 
Palestinian political expansion which interfered both in the 
internal  struggle  between  political  parties  and  in  family 
matters.”65 This assertion was in response to a question from 
the Journal regarding why it was that some Shi’a in the south 
apparently viewed the Israel arrival in a positive light. While 
disputing that all  Shi’a felt this way, Fadlallah nonetheless 
acknowledges  that  the  “Palestinians  were  expanding  in  a 
disturbing way”66 and that it is in the nature of some regional 
actors to “score points”67 against rivals in Palestinian-Arab 
political  disputes  by  turning  a  blind  eye  to  actions  they 
would  otherwise  condemn  (e.g.,  the  Israeli  invasion  of 
Southern Lebanon).
Later,  Fadlallah  is  even more explicit  that  he believes 
“that the Arab political scene, and particularly the Lebanese 
scene,  is  moving  to  free  itself  from  the  burden  of  the 
Palestine  problem.”68 While  Fadlallah  discusses  in  this 
interview that Hizballah has goals that include the essential 
elimination  of  Israel  as  a  political  force,  and  uses  this  to 
distinguish  Hizballah  from  Amal  (which  had  more  limited 
goals of freeing Southern Lebanon from Israeli occupation), 
he nonetheless is careful to disentangle Hizballah from direct 
connection to the Palestinian cause as such.
Considerations like this place Hizballah in a bind. On the 
one  hand,  the  fact  that  Israel  actually  completed  their 
withdrawal from Lebanon in 2000 gave Hizballah enormous 
prestige, as Hizballah’s resistance had arguably led to the 
first  successful  case of  resistance against  Israeli  territorial 
aggression  in  the  region.  On  the  other  hand,  this 
development  also  meant  that  Hizballah  had  to  find  other 
goals to justify its continued existence as a regional political 
actor; this was complicated by the fact that their provision of 
social services, education, and medical care had broadened 
Hizballah’s  base  and contributed to  their  emergence as  a 
65
6
. Muhammad  Husayn  Fadlallah, The  Palestinians,  the  Shi’a,  and 
South Lebanon, J. PALESTINE STUD., Winter 1987, at 3, 4.
66 . Id. at 3.
67 . Id.
68 . Id. at 6.
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political force in Lebanon replete with explicit representative 
duties.
In  1991,  Hizballah  founded their  television  station,  al-
Manar  (“the  Lighthouse”).  Al-Manar  is  extremely  popular 
regionally, ranking second only to Al-Jazeera in popularity in 
the  West  Bank  and  Gaza  Strip.69 Al-Manar  broadcasts 
numerous  motivational  videos  with  stirring  slogans  and 
professionally produced graphics and music. These polemical 
videos serve several purposes, one of which, I  contend, is 
the facilitation of surrogate consciousness for the Palestinian 
plight in Lebanese viewers. Al-Manar station manager Nayef 
Krayem says as much, stating that the station has links to 
multiple  militant  Palestinian  groups  (including  the  military 
wing of Fatah’s Abu Musa faction and the al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades),  and  that  part  of  the  station’s  mission  is  to 
generate  material  and  moral  support  for  the  Palestinian 
struggle  against  Israeli  occupation.70 Hizballah  Deputy 
Secretary-General  Sheikh  Naim  Qassam  told  Lebanese 
Future Television that Hizballah provides “national  support 
to  the  Palestinians  through  al-Manar  television,”71 and 
Hussein Nasrallah’s rhetoric in multiple venues has included 
consciousness raising on behalf of the Palestinian struggle.72
Consider, for example, a video broadcast which includes 
images of a suicide bomber destroying an Israeli checkpoint. 
Or  in  another  case,  a  video  shows  footage  of  Israeli 
bulldozers knocking down Palestinian dwellings. A third video 
details  Palestinian  suicide  bombers  who  have  died  while 
killing  IDF members.  These  videos  emphasize  the  themes 
that would need to be developed if surrogate consciousness 
were to appear. Recall that (in the case of the development 
of related oppositional consciousness) the group would need 
to become aware of injustices, identify with the group being 
repressed, and feel the need to redress the injustices; in the 
case of surrogate consciousness, feeling of group belonging 
69
6
. See generally AVI JORISCH,  BEACON OF HATRED:  INSIDE HIZBALLAH’S AL-MANAR  
TELEVISION (2004).  Of  note,  I  disagree  with  many  of  the  policy 
recommendations  Jorisch  floats  in  this  book,  and  I  recognize  that  the 
Washington  Institute  has  a  “not-so-hidden”  agenda.  Even  so,  the  book 
offers  valuable  background  information,  and  the  CD  it  contains  has 
numerous video clips from station broadcasts which are very interesting 
and useful.
70
7
. Id. at 34.
71 . Id.
72 . Id. (Clips 17, 35 and 39 on the CD-ROM included with book).
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does not need to be present, or if it is present it is sustained 
only by common fate considerations and will also probably 
involve recognition that one is not actually a member of the 
surrogate  group.  Such  videos  lay  the  groundwork  for  all 
these things by raising awareness of injustices done to the 
Palestinians, by providing a means of redressing them (al-
Manar broadcasts bank account information for those who 
wish to donate to organizations which support violent action 
in response, and also provides sometime material and moral 
support to Palestinian organizations such as Hamas), and by 
laying the emotional groundwork for support for things like 
the  second  Intifada  via  the  use  of  resonant  music  and 
emotion-laden images.73
One  objection  is  that  to  assume  any  particular 
broadcasts reflect shifts in strategic goals of Hizballah would 
be unjustified. This is probably the case. For instance, there 
are  links  between  themes  emphasized  in  al-Manar 
programming and short-term political  goals  related  to  the 
Lebanese  elections.  Consider,  for  instance,  the  period 
between May and September 2000, in which the tone and 
content  shifted  to  emphasize  the  Israeli  withdrawal  from 
Lebanon,  Hizballah’s  successful  military  campaign,  and 
Israeli military weaknesses. The “triumph over Israel” theme 
was probably related not just to facts on the ground about 
the  Israeli/Lebanon  situation  but  also  to  the  upcoming 
September  2000 Lebanese  parliamentary  elections.74 Even 
so, the shift in tone and content about the Palestinian plight 
has sustained itself for long enough that the conclusion that 
this change from the attitude of practiced distant concern of 
the mid-80’s is more than a tactical political development is 
plausible. It passes the sniff test.
14.UPSHOTS OF SURROGACY
Whether this development is a positive one remains an 
open question. On the one hand, it  increases the chances 
Hizballah will continue to develop a bona fide constituency 
and moderate its  goals  so they become irredentist  rather 
than millenarian, making it  all  the more likely those goals 
can be achieved by peaceful political means. This may have 
73
7
. Id. at 67–70. I realize these examples do not necessarily disprove 
the null hypothesis. They are suggestive, however.
74 . Id. at 37.
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the  pleasant  upshot  of  marginalizing  the  militant  wing  of 
Hizballah. As Baylouny points out, involvement in democratic 
institutions has a moderating influence even on those who 
have  anti-system  goals.75 Cultivation  of  a  bona  fide 
constituency  tends  to  decrease  the  likelihood  of  violent 
political  action,  as  such  cultivation  usually  involves  the 
formation  of  moderate  organizations  and  institutions 
designed to minister to the needs of this constituency.
On the other hand, if  Palestinians are unable to reach 
accommodation with Israel through non-violent means (e.g, 
via  the  resurgent  peace  process),  the  development  of 
surrogate consciousness could retrench Hizballah’s militant 
elements,  which  would  not  be  a  favorable  development.76 
Developing surrogate consciousness boosts the complexity 
and interconnectedness of the system; from a policy-making 
perspective,  this  can  be  both  a  good  and  bad  thing, 
contingent upon how the system as a whole develops.
Before  concluding,  let  us  acknowledge  the  multiple 
limitations  afflicting  my  thesis  for  this  Article.  These 
limitations  include  not  only  space  limitations  but  also  my 
radically  incomplete  survey  of  Hizballah  rhetoric  and 
propaganda, amplified by the complication that the author 
does  not  speak  or  read  Arabic  (this  limitation  is  being 
redressed in the long run).  The necessary resources were 
not available to distinguish between elite rhetoric and other 
layers of stratification in Hizballah’s organization; a more in-
depth study would discuss this difference in detail.77 Nor did 
this Article provide a comprehensive review of the political 
75
7
. Ann Marie Baylouny, Democratic Inclusion: A Solution to Militancy in 
Islamic  Movements,  STRATEGIC INSIGHTS,  Apr.  2004,  at  2, 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2004/apr/baylounyApr04.asp.
76 . Daniel Byman argues that we should not crack down on Hizballah 
itself,  but  should  instead  focus  on  undercutting  Iranian  and  Syrian 
stakeholder  involvement.  This  tack,  he  contends,  will  maximize  the 
chances  that  Hizballah  will  fully  become  a  mainstream  political  actor. 
Daniel Byman,  Should Hezbolah Be Next?,  FOREIGN AFF., Nov./Dec. 2003, at 
54, 64–66.
77 . Consider, for example, Glenn Robinson’s argument that Hamas and 
the PLO converged in their use of symbology even as animosity between 
elites in the organizations persisted.  GLENN E. ROBINSON,  BUILDING A PALESTINIAN 
STATE 160–62 (1997). While I would assume that Hizballah elites control al-
Manar  content,  I  am  not  familiar  enough  with  al-Manar’s  production 
process to say so with complete assurance. An interesting and important 
project would be to analyze elite control over Hizballah rhetoric especially 
in light of use of media like call-in televised talk shows and the internet 
where centralized control of content becomes more difficult.
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context in which Hizballah has been acting. On the whole, 
however, despite these limitations these linked theses are at 
least plausible and worthy of further investigation.
CONCLUSION
This Article argued for a series of  hypotheses. First,  it 
distinguished the concept of surrogate consciousness from 
related  psychological  processes  involved  in  framing. 
Surrogate  consciousness  arises  from  the  conjunction  of 
empathetic responses with a “thin” sense of shared identity 
even in the face of obvious and self-acknowledged out-group 
distinctions;  it  can  play  a  critical  role  in  broadening  an 
organization’s base of support. Second, by analyzing official 
documents of Hizballah and the rhetoric of Hizballah leaders 
such as Nasrallah and Fadlallah and the al-Manar television 
station, it provided (admittedly slim) evidence that the Party 
of God has broadened its goals and that this in turn has led 
to  narrative  efforts  designed  to  boost  surrogate 
consciousness  in  the  Shi’a  of  Lebanon  for  the  plight  of 
Palestinians  in  the  occupied  territories.  Third,  and  most 
briefly,  this  Article  argued  that  whether  this  is  a  positive 
development  is  an  open  question.  It  contributes  to 
Hizballah’s  maintenance of  a  constituency,  which  is  a  net 
positive, but it could also lead to identification with militant 
means of resolving disputes should the latest incarnation of 
the Palestinian/Israeli peace process fail. Irrespective of how 
political events in the Middle East shape—and are shaped by
—Hizballah in the future, this Article has driven home the 
importance  of  understanding  the  rhetorical  and  narrative 
“top  cover”  movements  and  organizations  use.  Only  by 
engaging in this endeavor in subtle (and sympathetic) ways 
can we hope to shift the story-telling atmosphere in such a 
manner that peaceful resolutions to political conflict become 
the norm in the region. In other words, a critical aspect of 
shifting culture will involve understanding how military force 
produces  change  in  the  narratives  which  shape 
organizational development.
It also has served as a test bed for a larger theoretical 
point,  one that  could  be the subject  for  a major  research 
program:  the  relationship  between  narratives,  the 
development  of  identity,  and  the  presence  of  empathy. 
Understanding how these three things are interrelated could 
help  us  improve  not  only  the  struggle  against  political 
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violence and how to help Hizballah develop into a legitimate 
political actor renouncing terrorism, but also how genocides 
happen to how we can better engineer a judicial system that 
is  fair  and  just.  These  are  all  important  and  pressing 
questions for our time.
